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12.1 Introduction
Major global food commodities experienced unexpected price spikes in 2007/2008
and again in 2010. This raised serious concerns about the impact of global price
shocks and volatility on food security in developing countries. There have been
several attempts to investigate the impacts of price shocks on income and poverty
as well as nutrition indicators. Some of these papers quantified the number of
people who were pushed below the poverty line due to increased food prices
(and decreased real incomes) at 105–150 million (de Hoyos and Medvedev 2011;
Ivanic and Martin 2008); Tiwari and Zaman (2010) estimated that 63 million
people became food insecure, as measured by the number of people who consume
less than 1810 calories/day. However, as these studies used either domestic food
prices, whereby the linkage to global prices is not directly clear (de Hoyos and
Medvedev 2011), or the ad hoc assumption that price transmissions from global
markets are uniform (Ivanic and Martin 2008; Tiwari and Zaman 2010), they
cannot provide a satisfactory answer about the impacts of global price shocks. The
heterogeneous degree of price transmission from international to domestic markets
has to be considered explicitly for ex-post impact analysis as well as early warning
and information systems, which are aimed at identifying upcoming food security
risks.
There are some controversies about the role of international commodity prices
in the local food security of developing countries. A common explanation for
the low integration of developing countries, in particular African countries, in
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global markets is that many of them import only small amounts of the commodity
they consume and that trade does not take place continuously. Additionally,
transaction costs due to transportation costs and trade barriers, like tariffs and
quotas, are considered to reduce price transmission. Existing research has there-
fore come to different conclusions regarding the degree of price transmission,
depending on the considered domestic market, crop and international reference
price.
So far, a comprehensive analysis of the extent of price transmission for the 1.2
billion people worldwide living below the poverty line is missing: We neither have
an estimation of how many poor people are affected by global market-induced food
price changes nor do we know the heterogeneous extent of price transmission. While
the recent FAO report on the State of Food Insecurity in the World (FAO 2013)
attempted to provide an aggregate picture of the extent of price transmission, it
used regionally aggregated food price indices which showed only weak linkages to
global prices and price volatility.1 The use of regionally aggregated price indices,
however, masks the heterogeneity of countries and commodities: combining prices
from markets with high market integration and low (or missing) market integration
will give an average low transmission that distracts from the serious impacts of
international price shocks on some markets.
This paper aims to fill this gap by providing a globally comprehensive but
nationally differentiated analysis of price transmission which maps transmission
elasticities to the size of the vulnerable population. The result will be a Lorenz-type
curve showing how many poor people are affected by international price shocks
and how strong these effects are. The paper also provides a pragmatic way to deal
with the heterogeneity of local food staples by creating a domestic grain price
index which is highly relevant to the poor and vulnerable population. Our grain
price index is preferable to the food price indices from national statistical agencies
used in FAO (2013), Cachia (2014), and Ianchovichina et al. (2012) because the
latter often contain processed and luxury food items that are of little relevance to
the poor. As for these products, material costs play a minor role; therefore, using
official food price indices would likely result in an underestimation of the degree of
price transmission to the costs of the food basket of poor people. On the contrary,
using individual crop prices instead of price indices – as in most existing studies –
inflates the reported results of the empirical analysis, neglects possible substitution
effects between grains, and complicates the interpretation of the severity of price
transmission.
The market integration of developing countries is a highly relevant topic for
policymakers and international organizations. Market integration presents both
opportunities and risks. The larger a market is, the better its capability to diversify
1Cachia (2014) provides a more detailed overview on methods and data on regional price
transmission.
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(uncorrelated) shocks; this generally has a stabilizing effect on prices, benefitting
producers as well as consumers. In contrast, integration into global markets makes
domestic markets vulnerable to “external” shocks that are beyond the control of
the national government, in particular, international price volatility (Kornher and
Kalkuhl 2013). Market liberalization may further be incompatible with domestic
price stabilization schemes, such as buffer stocks.
In this paper, we do not attempt to assess the costs and benefits of market
integration. Leaving the normative debate aside, we address the descriptive question
of the extent of market integration, which forms the basis of not only further nor-
mative analyses but also an appropriate impact assessment of global price shocks.
Mapping price transmission with vulnerable population is one important step toward
a better understanding of the impacts of recent global food price spikes since
2007. Additionally, our mapping analysis helps to identify the crucial international
reference prices that should be monitored carefully in early warning and food
security information systems. Finally, the calculated transmission elasticities can
be used for forecasting the partial effect of international commodity price dynamics
on local food prices and thus food security.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 12.2 provides an overview on existing
literature on price transmission and market integration. Section 12.3 establishes
the theoretical framework by drawing on basic trade and storage models from the
literature. This section in particular helps to explain price transmission when trade
is (temporarily) absent.2 Section 12.4 describes the empirical model to estimate
price transmission. Section 12.5 presents the price data used and the calculation
of a domestic grain price index as an alternative reference price for the costs of
the food basket of the poor. Section 12.6 discusses the results of the transmission
analysis, including some robustness checks for different specifications. Section 12.7
summarizes the findings and concludes the chapter with policy and research
implications.
12.2 Existing Work on Price Transmission
In the wake of the large swings in international commodity prices, there have
been various researches on market integration and price transmission. Using staple
prices on several sub-Saharan African markets, Minot (2010) calculated that the
price increase in the region was on average 71 % of the corresponding world
market increase in 2007/2008. Because static correlations between prices might
be spurious and no compelling evidence for market integration exists (Ravallion
2Götz et al. (2013) provided an analysis on the price transmission of Ukraine and Russia during
different trade regimes. The authors find that price transmission was also present during times of
tight export quotas and high export taxes but stronger during liberal trade regimes.
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1986), Minot (2010) extended the correlation analysis by applying a vector error
correction model (VECM). This model, however, suggests that only one-fifth of the
considered domestic price series have a long-run relationship to international prices.
The estimated price elasticities range from 16 to 97 %. In general, rice prices seem
to be more integrated than maize prices.
Robles (2011) estimated price transmission with an autoregressive distributed lag
(ADL) model for some Latin American and three Asian countries using retail prices
(Latin America) and wholesale prices (Asia) between 2000 and 2008. Transmission
to processed food items is reported to be lower than to raw commodities. The
average transmission from international wheat to domestic bread and pasta prices
is 20 % and 24 %, respectively. In contrast, transmission of rice and wheat prices
in Asia to the raw commodity prices varies a lot among the considered cities, but
values higher than 50 % are reported for several cities.
Using a similar econometric approach but considering food price indices instead
of commodity prices, Ianchovichina et al. (2012) analyzed price transmission to
Middle East and North Africa countries. They report transmission for several
countries in the range of 20–40 %. Greb et al. (2012) attempted to investigate
price transmission and made some observations about the extent and determinants
of market integration by assessing existing literature and by an own analy-
sis based on FAO GIEWS price data. In their meta-analysis, they found that
rice markets are more integrated than maize markets. They reported substantial
price transmission to domestic markets (long-run price transmission coefficient of
75 %).
Most recently, Baquedano and Liefert (2014) calculated short- and long-run
transmission coefficients for several commodities in developing countries within
a single-equation error correction model (SEECM). They found that most consumer
markets in developing countries are co-integrated with world markets although
their speed of equilibrium adjustment is rather low. Cachia (2014) provided an
overview of different concepts and models of price transmission and estimated
market integrations and price transmission between the FAO (global) food price
index and regionally aggregated food price indices (based on consumer price indices
from national statistical agencies). His findings suggest limited market integration
and rather slow transmission, which might be related to the use of aggregated food
price indices as discussed above.
12.3 Theoretical Framework
Domestic prices are linked to world market prices primarily through trade. If a
commodity is imported, its domestic price pDt equals its international price p
G
t plus
the transaction costs  I;Et for import I and export E. Depending on the trade balance
(a positive Tt denotes exports, a negative Tt imports), we can therefore distinguish
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the three cases (Samuelson 1952)3:
pDt D pGt C  It if Tt < 0 (12.1a)














is the inverse of the domestic demand function, which depends on
consumption QDt and income Y
D
t . Equations (12.1a)–(12.1c) imply that the domestic
price is independent from the global price if and only if it is neither profitable to
export nor to import the commodity, that is if






< pGt C  It (12.2)
Spatial arbitrage through trade links domestic and global prices immediately. There
exists, however, also another form of arbitrage through storage which links current
prices to expected (future) prices. Assuming rational expectations, current prices are
a function of expected futures prices (Wright and Williams 1991):
pt D ˇEt Œ ptC1 if It > 0; (12.3a)
pt > ˇEt Œ ptC1 if It D 0; (12.3b)
where pt is the price of the commodity at time t; ˇ D .1  ı/ = .1 C r/ contains the
interest rate r and rate of deterioration ı; Et Œ refers to the expectation at time t; and
It denotes the inventory of grains. When there are no inventories (It D 0), current
and future prices are not directly linked through intertemporal arbitrage.
Consider now the case of a country which has a zero or negative trade balance
(that may change over time) but which is never in an exporting state. Combining
Eqs. (12.1a) and (12.3a) for the domestic and global markets and assuming positive
storage on both, for exactly s consecutive periods without trade, we obtain:




E ŒtCs if ID;GtCj > 0; TtCj D 0 for 0 < j < s; (12.4)
where  ´ ˇD
ˇG
D .1ıD/.1CrG/
.1ıG/.1CrD/ . Equation (12.4) indicates that domestic prices
depend on global prices even when there is no trade in a sequence of s periods. If
3In the subsequent theoretical analysis, we will assume that all transaction costs are unit costs
and independent of the price level pGt . Considering ad-valorem transaction costs &
I
t (e.g., due to
transport insurance, value-added tax, or ad-valorem tariffs), Eq. (12.1a) would change to pDt D
pGt

1 C & It
 C  It . As the ad-valorem component has no impact on the transmission elasticity (it














Fig. 12.1 Linkage between domestic and international prices through storage, trade, and expec-
tations. Source: Own elaboration, based on Eqs. (12.1)–(12.4)
trade is expected in future periods (which brings domestic and global prices back
to equilibrium), current domestic prices are adjusted according to intertemporal
arbitrage. The relation between domestic and international markets for the direct
trade regime and the indirect transmission regime (expected trade, with storage) is
depicted in Fig. 12.1.
In the case of trade, prices at t are directly linked. In the case of no trade at t but
expected trade at t C s, prices at t are indirectly linked through storage and expected
trade arbitrage.








pGt C ŒˇGsE ŒtCs








<0, 0 .E ŒtCs/ <0;
and 0.s/ > 0. Thus, transmission increases in the global price level, and it
decreases in the storage discount factor ˇG and in expected transaction costs E ŒtCs.
Transmission increases, however, in the distance s to the next trade period: the
longer the period of no trade, the stronger domestic prices respond to global prices
(if storage domestic and global stocks are strictly positive during that period).
Table 12.1 gives an overview of the different possible trade and storage regimes
and how they determine domestic prices and price transmission. In the case of trade,
4For s D 0, the transmission elasticity collapses to the standard form (direct transmission in case




. As argued above, any ad-valorem transaction costs cancel out in the
price transmission.
























































































































































































































































































or in case of expected (future) trade, and positive domestic and global stocks, there
is always a positive price transmission from global to domestic markets. However, if
global stocks are zero5 (i.e., if global prices are not in an intertemporal equilibrium),
current global prices do not affect current domestic prices. Nevertheless, current
domestic prices are in equilibrium with the expected global prices (which might, in
turn, be a function of current global prices). Only in the remaining cases whereby all
stocks are zero or whereby there will never be trade, domestic prices are completely
decoupled from global prices. In these cases, domestic prices are solely determined
by the conditions of domestic supply and demand, and price transmission is zero.
The theoretical analysis revealed two further interesting insights: For each trade
regime, the transmission elasticity  is not affected by ad-valorem transaction costs
(which include ad-valorem taxes and tariffs), and it is furthermore independent of
the traded amount. In other words, the transmission elasticity will be the same
for a country with small and large imports as long as the (unit) transaction costs
are the same. Finally, the formal analysis emphasizes the role of storage in price
transmission. Traditionally, storage is seen as a buffer against supply shocks,
and this buffer reduces price fluctuations. As (private) storage, however, links
current and future prices via expectations, it links domestic prices to global prices
even if no trade occurs. Hence, storage could make a country more vulnerable
against international price shocks because domestic prices are additionally linked
to international prices through expectations.
While trade and storage link domestic prices to international prices of the
same commodity, substitution effects might also link non-traded commodities to
international prices if they are substitutes for traded commodities. The magnitude
of substitution effects is expressed in the cross-price elasticity of demand, relating
the percentage change in a commodity price to the percentage change in the price
of a substitute. Hence, we would also expect price transmission to non-traded local
products if they are substitutes for traded commodities. This is in particular the case
for staples or different edible oils.
12.4 Empirical Model
As we are interested in the transmission of global shocks to domestic prices,
any empirical analysis should consider intra-annual prices. However, many of the
variables that determine price transmission (like grain stocks and trade) are only
observable on an annual basis and suffer additionally from substantial measurement
5Zero stocks refer here to the theoretical model. In real-world settings, stocks become rarely zero
because a certain amount of grains will be always stored for operational purposes. This “operational
stock,” however, is not part of the intertemporal arbitrage dynamics as it is used to ensure deliveries
and does not respond to (expected) prices.
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errors and data quality problems.6 While there are models that allow data of different
frequencies to be combined [e.g., GARCH-MIDAS for analyzing volatility, see
Engle et al. (2013)], estimating them requires typically a large sample size. Because
most of our price series start after the year 2000, we used a pure time-series approach
to quantify country- and crop-specific “average” transmission elasticities instead of
estimating the underlying fundamental model parameters, like the transaction costs,
trade flows, and storage levels.
Time-series models are often confronted with the problem of nonstationary data
series, which generates biased estimates and high R2 due to spurious regression of
explanatory variables with trends which leads to the overestimation of t-values in
the case of autocorrelation. The typical approach to deal with a nonstationary time
series is to differentiate the data until it becomes stationary. If the time series is also
co-integrated (i.e., there exists a linear combination of the series that is integrated
of order one), it is possible to estimate the long-run relationship between trended
variables within an error correction model (ECM) (Engle and Granger 1987). If the
time series is integrated to the order of one but not co-integrated, one can analyze
the first-differenced, stationary time series within an autoregressive distributive lag
model (ADL). If the time series is stationary, the ECM can be made equivalent to
an ADL (De Boef and Keele 2008).
An ECM would be the favorable model to test for market integration (i.e., co-
integration of domestic and international price series). However, the transmission
of short-term shocks in international prices to domestic prices, which is the focus
of this paper, does not require co-integrated time series. Relying on co-integrated
time series only could exclude countries with significant transmission of shocks.7
Using an ADL for this set of countries would be one option. As the estimated short-
run transmission elasticities of the ADL are not directly comparable to the ECM,
which controls for error correction, we prefer to use the same econometric model
for all countries and series. Hence, we used an ADL with stationary first-differenced
logarithmic prices, which is suitable for all countries and price series.8 Our basic
























tj C ıdwim C cdwi C "dwi;t ;
(12.5)
6Stocks data is, for example, lacking for many countries. Published stock data (e.g. on the USDA-
PSD database) is for many developing countries based on rough estimates and balance sheet
calculations rather than original survey data.
7Additionally, testing for a unit root process, a necessary condition for the ECM, is problematic
due to the low performance of unit root tests. Hence, the use of the ADL avoids the risk of using a
misspecified ECM.
8The stationarity of all domestic and international price series was tested using the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test. While only a few of the original series are stationary, all first-differenced series
are stationary with a test statistic below the 1 % critical value. Results are available upon request.
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where xt D xt  xt1 is the difference operator, pdi;t denotes the domestic reference
price d (or price index) in country i (all prices in logs) at time t, pwtj is a world
market reference price (or price index), ei;tj the exchange rate (in US dollars) of
country i, poilt is the oil price, ıi;m a monthly country-specific dummy to account
for seasonality, and cdwi is a (country and commodity specific) constant. We chose
the lag structure l D 3 and k D 3 in our base model, but we also explored different
lag structures (including optimal lags using information criteria) as a robustness
check. Although oil prices are neglected in most other studies, we considered them
important as they influence domestic production and transportation costs as well as
import costs (Minot 2010).
Controlling for seasonality (Helmberger and Chavas 1996) and oil prices may
allow us to consider important determinants of food and grain prices in particular
countries; it might, however, also weaken the reliability of the model due to
decreased degrees of freedom for countries in which seasonality or oil prices are
irrelevant. Therefore, to automatically select the appropriate model specification for
each country and commodity, we applied the Akaike information criterion to (1)
the full model, (2) a model which ignores oil prices, (3) a model which ignores
seasonality, and (4) a model which ignores both oil prices and seasonality.
We ran the regression in Eq. (12.5) separately for each country i, each inter-
national reference price pwt and each considered domestic food price p
d
t . With the
estimated coefficients, we calculated the short-run transmission ˇdwi D
Pk
jD1ˇdwij
and the pass-through  (i.e., the equilibrium effect of a marginal world price change









jD1ˇdwij and ˛dwi D
Pl
jD1˛dwij ; both terms are set to zero if they are
not significant at the 5 % level (F-test with Newey-West estimated standard errors).9
While ˇdwi gives the direct (short-term) price transmission within 1–3 months, the
autoregressive term ˛dwi further amplifies price changes in the subsequent periods.
The total effect is therefore given by the pass-through dwi . As we estimated ˇ
dw
i
and dwi separately for each country and international commodity price (index), we
obtained a matrix of transmission elasticities and pass-throughs for every domestic
food price index d.
9Significance levels of 10 % and 1 % were also employed to check robustness (see below). The
Newey-West estimator corrects for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We use a lag length of
6 months. The standard OLS procedure gives similar results (see below).
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12.5 Data
This study differs from other related studies because it used an extensive dataset
of international commodity prices and price indices, ranging from spot prices at
important export destinations to prices of relevant futures contracts.
Table 12.3 in the Appendix lists the prices that were used as international
reference prices and price indices. The main sources of information are the FAO
and the FAO GIEWS for the international food prices and price indices, the World
Bank (2013b) for important international spot prices, and Bloomberg for futures
prices. We also calculated indices over futures prices in order to better capture price
dynamics on commodity exchanges. For all futures prices, a time series consisting
of the respective active contract was used. All price series are monthly data (for
daily price series, like futures prices, monthly averages were calculated).
The food price indices (FPI), a part of the national consumer price indices (CPI),
served as reference database for the domestic prices. These data are available from
the LABORSTA database for 200 countries in the world in a monthly or quarterly
frequency (ILO 2013). We drop those countries which only report quarterly food
price indices and consider the years 2000–2012.10 While the LABORSTA database
has the advantage of covering many countries, the calculation of the food price
indices is not transparent for many countries. In particular, CPIs may suffer from
urban bias as price collection in urban area is less expensive than in remote rural
areas. Additionally, the weights in a CPI might reflect the consumption and spending
patterns of the urban lower-middle class rather than the very poor households that
spent up to 70 % of their expenditures on staple food (James 2008). For example,
dramatic changes in staple prices, which affect the real income of poor households,
might only lead to small changes in the domestic food price index, which consists
of processed foods as well as luxury food and beverages.
Because FPI data might be inadequate to monitor the food costs for poor people,
we developed an alternative staple grain price index which consists of the retail
prices of wheat, maize, rice, sorghum, and millet. We used several sources to
compile this retail price database and calculate the national average price in US$
across different markets for each of the commodity prices. We used prices in US$ to
avoid the problem of strong inflationary shocks, which are difficult to control for, but
provided robustness checks for prices in nominal and CPI-deflated local currencies.
We combined the different commodity prices into a price index according to their





10These countries are (20 in total) AIA, ASM, AUS, BLZ, BTN, COK, CYM, FRO, GUM, JEY,
KIR, MHL, MNP, NFK, NIU, PNG, SHN, SPM, TUV, and VUT.
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Table 12.2 Domestic food price indices
d Variable Description Source
FPI Food price index (FPI) National food price index
(nominal); 2000–2012
ILO (2013)
GPI Domestic grain price
index (GPI)
Index of the national average
retail prices (nominal US$) of
five staple grains for
2000–2012: wheat, maize, rice,
sorghum, and millet; weighted
according to domestic per capita
food supply for 2000–2009
Own calculation; domestic per
capita food supply from FAO;
retail prices from FEWS NET,
FAO GIEWS, WFP Price
Monitor, and national sources
Exchange rates were obtained from the IMF database. For the oil price, we consider the “average
oil price” of WTI, Brent and Dubai prices quoted at World Bank Commodities Price Database.
Source: Own elaboration
where ˛ij D Cij=Cj is the j-th crop’s share of the total consumption of the considered
grains in country i in kg over the period 2000–2009 and pitj is the corresponding crop
price at month t in US$ per kg. We used national average prices if available in one
of the databases (shown in Table 12.2); otherwise, we calculated an (unweighted)
national average price using all the markets price data available (again, using the
sources shown in Table 12.2). Our self-constructed grain price index accounts on
average for 45 % of the average national calorie consumption in many countries. As
the diet of poor people consists of a higher share of staples, our grain price index
is likely to cover more than the national average number for poor people which
increases its relevancy.
One drawback of the grain price index is the limited data availability. Contrary
to the food price index from national statistical offices, retail grain prices were
available for 65 countries only. Yet, as will be discussed later, the considered
countries are home to more than 90 % of the global poor, who live with an income
below $1.25 per day. Thus, the coverage with respect to poor people is much larger
than the “geographical” coverage. Another drawback of the grain price index is
that it is likely irrelevant to the countries where staples other than those grains
considered in this study are consumed as part of their diet (e.g., roots and tubers
in Uganda). Because of the advantages and disadvantages of both food price indices
and grain price indices, we considered both in our analysis. Table 12.2 summarizes
the characteristics and data sources for the domestic price indices.
12.6 Results
This section presents and discusses the calculated transmission elasticities. For
policymakers as well as for establishing early warning information systems, it might
be relevant to know whether a country’s food prices are linked to at least one
international commodity price. Subsequently, a country’s policymakers can access
the database on transmission elasticities to find out which particular commodity
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prices are transmitted from the international market to the domestic market of
that particular country. We therefore calculated a country-specific transmission
vulnerability indicator Vdi as the maximum transmission over the pass-throughs of







If this indicator is zero, domestic food markets are with a high degree of certainty
not vulnerable to global price shocks.11 If the indicator is high, there is high
transmission for at least one international commodity price (or price index), which
implies that the country is generally vulnerable to global market price changes. As
we will see, the vulnerability indicator provides an important benchmark for single
international prices or price indices, like the FAO food price index. We further
calculated the vulnerability indicator for subsets 	 of commodities, for example,
we calculated Vdi as maximum pass-through overall international rice prices.
12.6.1 Transmission from the FAO Food Price Index
We first considered the transmission from the FAO food price index – an interna-
tional reference price index – which is often used as an indicator for global food
market dynamics. We ran regressions for the transmission to domestic food prices
as well as to domestic grain prices. The magnitude of the aggregate transmission
elasticity ˇ (if significant at the 5 % level) is depicted in Fig. 12.2 for both
the domestic food price index (Fig. 12.2a) and the domestic grain price index
(Fig. 12.2b). The maps indicate that there was no significant transmission for
several developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Where there
was statistically significant transmission, it tended to be particularly high. These
findings are consistent with the other studies mentioned above but provide a more
comprehensive country coverage.
The map showing global transmission to domestic food price indices, for which
data is available for almost all countries in the world, reveals another interesting
finding: Several developed countries (North America, Europe) show a statistically
significant but low price transmission, while transmission to developing countries is
either insignificant (i.e., zero) or relatively high. An explanation for this finding is
that the food basket in developed countries consists of many processed food items;
commodity costs constitute only a very small share of the final price of process
food items. Thus, a price increase in a raw commodity translates only into a very
small price increase in the final product. This explains why price transmission to the
US domestic market is very low – although several of the international reference
prices used are quoted from US markets. The transmission from world to domestic
11However, they might still be co-integrated with world markets (through rather slow adjustment




Fig. 12.2 (a) Transmission from the FAO food price index to the domestic food price index (FPI).
(b) Transmission from the FAO food price index to the domestic grain price index (GPI)
markets showed high variance among developing countries because some of them
are not integrated into the world market due to high transaction costs. If a country is
integrated, price transmission to its domestic market is relatively high because raw
commodity costs are a major part of the price of many food items.
The FAO food price index is a much more aggregated price index. It uses weights
according to the export share on the global market of the considered commodities.
While this gives an appropriate average price index for globally traded commodities,
trade patterns may differ greatly among countries. For example, a country might
predominantly import rice, but rice prices have a very low weight in the FAO
food price index. By adding further international price indices and concentrating
on the vulnerability indicator (maximum transmission) for all the grain prices in
our database, we got a map which reveals a different result. Many Asian, African,
and Latin American countries experience significant and high price transmission
12 How Strong Do Global Commodity Prices Influence Domestic Food. . . 283
Fig. 12.3 Transmission to the domestic grain price index – vulnerability indicator over inter-
national grain prices. Note: Maximum transmission to the domestic grain price index using all
international grain prices in Table 12.3
(Fig. 12.3). For example, some of the West African countries showed high price
transmission to their domestic grain price index, which is primarily driven by
international rice prices as these countries import a large amount of rice. Note
that a low transmission elasticity of even as low as 20 % may have remarkable
implications: doubling of commodity prices (e.g., as was experienced for wheat
in 2007/2008) increases the costs of the entire food or staple commodity basket
by 20 %. This is an important difference when compared with other studies:
transmission elasticities for a single commodity do not reveal how important the
commodity is for the population. Using a price index, in contrast, weights the price
transmission in relation to the importance of the commodity to the diet of a country’s
population, and it also takes into account any potential substitution effects.
The use of the vulnerability indicator emphasizes that considering the FAO food
price index exclusively might lead to serious biases in the assessment of price
transmission downward. Thus, it is important to consider a larger set of reference
prices and price indices rather than only relying on the FAO food price index.
However, the FAO food price index remains a pragmatic alternative when only a
single international price (index) can be used.
12.6.2 Vulnerability Mapping: How Many Poor People Are Affected
by Global Price Changes?
To assess the impacts of global price changes, it is important to know how many
poor people live in countries with high price transmission. Price changes have often
heterogeneous impacts on the welfare of households, depending on their production
structure and market access (von Braun et al. 2013). High agricultural commodity
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prices can increase the income of poor rural households who produce cash crops
(Tefera et al. 2013). Nevertheless, such beneficial impacts are often realized in the
medium or long term when households adjust their production by growing high-
value crops. However, existing empirical analyses have concluded that sudden price
spikes negatively affect not only poor consumers and the landless but also farmers
who buy many food items as they cannot quickly adjust their production in the short
run (Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik 2008; Anríquez et al. 2013).
To assess how strongly poor people are exposed to global price changes, we took
the following steps: The transmission elasticities ˇ of the countries (e.g., regarding
the Chicago corn price or the vulnerability indicator containing the maximum
transmission by grain prices) were sorted in descending order. Next we calculated
the number of people living below the extreme poverty line of $1.25 per day12 using
poverty share and population data from the World Development Indicators (World
Bank 2013a).13
Figure 12.4 shows the transmission from different international grain prices to the
domestic grain price index. We calculated the maximum transmission (vulnerability
indicator) according to Eq. (12.1b) for each of the three commodities: wheat, corn,
and rice. Hence, the wheat line shows the maximum transmission for each country
from all the available wheat price series shown in Table 12.3. We calculated the total
vulnerability indicator as the maximum over the commodity indicators (blue line).
Regarding the extent of transmission, Fig. 12.4 clearly shows that rice prices
are most strongly transmitted; this has also been highlighted by other studies (e.g.,
Robles 2011; Baquedano and Liefert 2014). While wheat prices experience lower
transmission elasticities than rice prices for many countries, the tail is much longer
due to its impact on India, where one-third of the globally poor live. The all-
grain vulnerability indicator revealed that more than 1.06 billion poor people live
in countries with significant price transmission of 10 % or higher – which constitute
96 % of the poor in the countries studied in this chapter and 89 % of the poor
globally. More than 360 million poor people (one-third of the poor) live in countries
with transmission elasticities of 30 % or higher; about 44 million poor people live
in countries with transmission elasticities of 50 % or higher.
We decomposed the transmission further into the individual price series (see
Appendix, Figs. 12.8, 12.9, 12.10, 12.11 and 12.12) to identify the most relevant
international reference price for each of the commodities. Prices of futures contracts
at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) are the most relevant for wheat, in
particular regarding the number of people affected. Transmission elasticities from
CBOT prices are, however, topped by transmission rates from Canadian wheat and
Argentinian spot prices for some countries (e.g., Nigeria, Ethiopia, or Kenya). For
maize, US spot and futures prices were transmitted at rates ranging from 15 to
12Using the “moderate poverty line” of $2 per day gives qualitatively similar results. Quantitatively,
however, roughly double as many people are affected.
13Poverty rates are not available for every year. We use therefore the most recent number and
multiplied it with the 2012 number of total population.
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Fig. 12.4 Number and extent of poor people potentially affected by international price changes
(change of grain price index). Note: The figure shows the transmission elasticities over all countries
in descending order mapped to the number of people below the extreme poverty line in the
particular country. Source: Own illustration
50 % for 150 million poor people. Yellow and white maize prices at the South
African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) are strongly transmitted to Malawi at rates
higher than 70 %. There is no clear reference price emerging for rice. IGC rice
prices and Pakistani and Thai prices transmit at different rates to different countries,
with Nigeria experiencing high transmission, in particular from Thai prices and the
IGC price index.
Comparing the transmission indicated by the all-grain vulnerability indicator
with several other price indices emphasizes that using individual price index alone
would cause the size of the affected population to be underestimated. For example,
the FAO food price index, a popular international reference price, suggests that
700 million poor could be affected by global price shocks (due to its significant
transmission to India and China); the FAO cereals price suggests that 350 million
people could be affected – far below the numbers obtained from the all-grain
vulnerability indicator. The FAO food price index shows a higher transmission
elasticity than most indices that are based only on grain prices because the FAO
food price index has a lower variability.14
14The FAO food price index also contains meat and oils, which are processed food items that
typically fluctuate less than commodity prices. Comparing the FAO food price and cereals price
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Fig. 12.5 Number and extent of poor people potentially affected by changes of international price
indices. Source: Own illustration
Figure 12.5 further illustrates that about 850 million poor people might be
affected by price changes in US cereals futures contracts (140 million with
transmission rates of 30 % or higher), which is particularly relevant for the debate
on speculation and financialization (Tadesse et al. 2014; von Braun et al. 2013). The
transmission elasticities from commodity prices and price indices for countries with
at least one million people living below the poverty line are listed in Table 12.4 in
the Appendix.
The calculations shown in Figs. 12.4 and 12.5 require an important qualification:
They represent the likely upper bound of the number of people affected. More
precisely, they show the number of poor people living in countries affected by a
specific price transmission. Not all poor people in a country with positive price
transmission experience international price changes. In developing countries, in
particular Africa, poor people in remote rural areas lack access to markets due
to bad infrastructure (Barrett 2008; Nelson 2008). As discussed previously, food
price indices from national statistical agencies could exhibit biases because of
their focus on urban centers, making them less relevant for the rural population
index between 1990 and 2011, the former shows an average change rate of ˙0.8 % per month,
while the latter changes ˙1.3 % per month. We would therefore expect a roughly 60 % higher
transmission from FAO food prices for an identical commodity composition compared to cereals
prices.
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Fig. 12.6 Comparison of transmission and pass-through. Source: Own illustration
in remote areas. A transmission analysis based on food price indices from national
statistical agencies would overstate the number of affected poor as one would expect
lower price transmission from international prices to remote rural markets. The
use of the grain price index which also considers grain prices from rural markets
is an important alternative because it is constructed independent of the FPI using
alternative price data. Nevertheless, the markets considered in this study are far from
comprehensive, and prices for many rural areas are missing. The number of poor
people in affected countries therefore only indicates the potential number of people
affected (which would be the same if domestic markets were perfectly integrated).
12.6.3 Pass-Through and Equilibrium Effects
While the sum of the coefficients of international prices ˇ gives the relative
magnitude of price transmission 1–3 months after a spike, the pass-through 
considers long-run equilibrium adjustments due to the autoregressive term (see
Sect. 12.4 above). Figure 12.6 depicts the vulnerability indicator (maximum overall
international grain prices) for both transmission and pass-through to the domestic
food price index as well as to the domestic grain price index. Consistent with
Figs. 12.2 and 12.3, we found that transmission elasticities are considerably higher
for the domestic grain price index than for the domestic food price index. The
long-run equilibrium effect of international price spikes is substantially higher: For
high vulnerable countries, the long-run effect is approximately twice as high as the
short-run effect. The discrepancy between short-run transmission and long-run pass-
288 M. Kalkuhl
though is higher when domestic grain prices instead of domestic food prices are
considered. This is due to the more important role of the auto-regressive dynamics.
12.6.4 Robustness Checks
The outcome of our econometric analysis depends on not only the chosen model
specification but also the considered significance levels. We therefore discuss the
implications of different model specifications for our findings. We confine our
discussion only to the vulnerability indicator for grain prices, in particular, with
regard to its mapping to affected poor people (as shown in Fig. 12.4).
12.6.4.1 Significance Levels
If the null hypothesis of zero transmission cannot be rejected at the 5 % level, we set
the transmission to zero; otherwise, we use the point estimate for the calculation of
the transmission. Changing the significance level to 10 % increases the likelihood
of erroneously detecting transmission to a country’s domestic market when there
is none; it reduces, however, the possibility of wrongly concluding that there is no
price transmission in the case that the F-test does not reject the null hypothesis
of zero transmission. We therefore employed two different significance levels (at
10 % and 1 %) to check the sensitivity of our results. As shown in the Appendix,
a significance level of 10 % has only marginal impacts on the extent of price
transmission and the number of poor people affected (Fig. 12.7). For a stricter
significance level of 1 %, the transmission is lower relative to the poor population:
Many countries on the right tail (with low transmission rates) do not pass the stricter
significance test. Nevertheless, transmission elasticities for the 550 million poor
people in countries with significant transmission hardly changed when compared
with the lower significance levels.
12.6.4.2 CPI-Deflated Food Prices
It is often argued that nominal price changes are less relevant because monetary
inflation might change the overall price level and therefore the purchasing power
of money. To study welfare impacts of price changes, one would ideally deflate
nominal prices with (nominal) income for consumers. This information is, however,
hardly available.15 Using the consumer price index (CPI) is a pragmatic alternative,
although CPIs do not measure the income or wage of people but rather the costs of
goods a consumer who is representative of the population buys. For some countries
(e.g., Bangladesh), food items have a share over 50 % of the CPI (ILO 2013). Thus,
even without any monetary inflation and without any increases in wages or prices
of other consumption goods, an increase in food prices by 10 % would increase the
CPI by more than 5 %. Deflating the food price change with the CPI would then
15For households with substantial income from selling their agricultural produce, prices of inputs
need also to be considered (Dorward 2011).
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result in a “real” price change of 5 %, although wages and other consumer prices
would remain constant. Deflating the food price index with the CPI would in such
cases understate the impact on welfare due to price changes.
Due to the lack of monthly wage or income data, we resorted to deflating food
prices by the CPI despite knowing its shortcomings. As our grain price index used
prices in the US dollar, which shows very low monthly inflation rates, we performed
this robustness check only for the domestic food price analysis. As expected, the
transmission to CPI-deflated food price indices was lower than to nominal food
prices (Fig. 12.7). The transmission-population curves obtained are similar to our
standard model, although slightly lower to the right tail (in particular, for India
which experiences high inflation). Using nominal prices in the local currency also
gave results similar to our standard model. The robustness of our findings regarding
the choice of the currency and deflator is probably due to the use of first differences
of log prices, which cancel out inflation, and the use of heteroskedasticity-corrected
standard errors by the Newey-West method.
12.6.4.3 OLS Versus Newey-West
To check the robustness of the Newey-West approach with time lags of 6 months,
we also included regressions based on the standard OLS, whereby homoskedasticity
is assumed for calculating standard errors and thus significance levels. The OLS
method allows for a much faster calculation of the standard errors; this becomes
important when applying the method to many country and commodity time series.
As indicated in Fig. 12.7, OLS gives similar results, although transmission rates
were slightly lower as high transmission elasticities for some commodities did not
pass the t-test at the 5 % level anymore.
12.7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to better understand the transmission of shocks from
international prices to domestic food prices. Our analytical model emphasized that
international price changes can be transmitted through intertemporal arbitrage of
storage even if no trade takes place. Our empirical analysis suggests that focusing
only on the FAO Food or Cereal Price Indices might cause the vulnerability of the
poor to international price changes to be understated. Likewise, food price indices
from national statistics might be biased, being more representative of (on average
wealthier) urban consumers, who buy and consume relatively more processed sta-
ples and luxuries. To avoid these shortcomings, we used a comprehensive database
on international reference prices and constructed a domestic grain price index based
on retail prices in developing countries and the considered commodities’ share of the
total consumption. Our price database allows for almost universal country coverage,
in particular, with respect to countries where poor people live. For the first time
therefore, we were able to estimate how many poor people live in countries where
international price changes are transmitted to domestic prices.
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Our empirical analysis illustrated that the vast majority of the poor (over 90 %)
live in countries where food prices are linked more or less strongly to international
prices in the short term that is within 1–3 months. For 360 million poor people,
international prices transmit to their country at rates of 30 % or higher. The empirical
analysis considered seasonality and oil prices (endogenous model selection). The
findings were robust at different significance levels and for different price deflators.
Because of our chosen lag structure of 3 months, we expect that international
price shocks will translate to domestic price shocks rather quickly. Existing research
on the impact of price changes on the welfare of poor consumers has paid more
attention to the differentiated and heterogeneous effects of price changes, depending
on the production and consumption structure. While higher prices can benefit net
sellers of the affected crops, they make poor consumers, net buyer farmers and rural
landless worse off in the short term. Several quantitative estimates concluded that
the negative effects overweigh the positive effects, for example, with respect to the
number of people falling below the poverty line – at least in the short term when
production is not able to respond flexibly to higher prices (Ivanic and Martin 2008;
Tiwari and Zaman 2010; de Hoyos and Medvedev 2011; Anríquez et al. 2013).
There are also concerns that price increases affect poor consumers more than the
effect of a symmetric price decrease on producers of food: While poor consumers
can run into serious problems because they cannot afford sufficient food, producers
may still have enough (self-grown) food to eat, even though their income may be
significantly reduced (Kalkuhl et al. 2013).
Although our analysis focused on the transmission of price levels rather than
price risk or volatility, one can expect that high international volatility (measured in
the fluctuations of monthly prices) would also increase domestic food price volatility
(see also Chap. 13). While the impacts of price changes on welfare are as yet unclear,
higher volatility may have negative effects on welfare because of an increase in the
production risks for farmers and, thus, undermining long-term food supply (Haile
and Kalkuhl 2013; Haile et al. 2013).
The transmission analysis and the estimated elasticities could be used in early
warning systems to detect vulnerable countries in times of high international price
swings. It could further be extended to explain the different degrees of price
transmission by using other explanatory variables like transportation costs, trade,
GDP, or grains stocks.
Acknowledgments I would like to thank Felix Baquedano for his valuable comments and
suggestions on the econometric model as well as the representation of the findings. I further thank
Mekbib Haile, Manuel Hernandez, Lukas Kornher, and Miguel Robles for their useful comments
on an earlier version of this paper. I am grateful to Mikko Bayer, David Schaefer, and Christian
Zimpelmann for building and enhancing the database on international and domestic food and
commodity prices; Tobias Heimann helped converting the figures to EPS format. We thank the FAO
GIEWS team and FEWS NET for providing price data on commodities in developing countries.
Financial support from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
is gratefully acknowledged.
12 How Strong Do Global Commodity Prices Influence Domestic Food. . . 291
Appendix
International Reference Prices and Price Indices
Table 12.3 Considered international reference prices and price indices
w Variable Description Source
1 FAO food price index Consists of 55 commodity quotations considered
as representing the international prices of food
commodities; weighted by export share
FAO
2 FAO cereals price index Consists of wheat, maize, and rice prices;
weighted by export share
FAO
3 FAO oil/fat price index Consists of 12 different oils (including animal
and fish oils); weighted by export share
FAO
4 FAO sugars price index Index form of the International Sugar Agreement
prices with 2002–2004 as base
FAO
5 FAO meat price index Consists of poultry, bovine meat, pig meat, and
ovine meat products; weighted by export share
FAO
6 FAO dairy price index Consists of butter, skimmed milk powder,
whole-milk powder, cheese, and casein prices;
weighted by export share
FAO
7 WB grain price index Includes barley, maize, rice, and wheat World Bank
8 WB fats and oils price
index
Includes coconut oil, groundnut oil, palm oil,
soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal
World Bank
9 Wheat (HRW) US No. 1, hard red winter, ordinary protein, export
price delivered at the US Gulf port for prompt or
30 days’ shipment
World Bank
10 Wheat (SRW) US No. 2, soft red winter, export price delivered at
the US Gulf port for prompt or 30 days’ shipment
World Bank
11 Wheat CAN Wheat (Canada), no. 1, western red spring
(CWRS), in store, St. Lawrence, export price
World Bank
12 Wheat AUS Australian soft white, Australia, f.o.b. USDA/IGC
Australia Eastern States Standard White Wheat
FOB Spot (for 10/2007–09/2008 where
USDA/IGC series has missing entries)
Bloomberg
13 Barley Barley (Canada), feed, western no. 1, Winnipeg
Commodity Exchange, spot, wholesale farmers’
price
World Bank
14 Sorghum US Sorghum (US), no. 2 milo yellow, f.o.b. Gulf
ports
World Bank
15 Corn US Maize (US), no. 2, yellow, f.o.b. US Gulf ports World Bank
16 Soybeans Soybeans (US), c.i.f. Rotterdam World Bank
17 Soybean oil Soybean oil (Any origin), crude, f.o.b. ex-mill
Netherlands
World Bank
18 Soybean meal Soybean meal (any origin), Argentine 45/46 %
extraction, c.i.f. Rotterdam beginning 1990;





w Variable Description Source
19 Rice Thai A1 Rice (Thailand), 100 % broken, A.1 Super from
2006 onward, government standard, f.o.b.
Bangkok; prior to 2006, A1 Special, a slightly
lower grade than A1 Super
World Bank
20 Rice Thai 5 % Rice (Thailand), 5 % broken, white rice (WR),
milled, indicative price based on weekly surveys
of export transactions, government standard,
f.o.b. Bangkok
World Bank
21 Rice Thai 25 % Rice (Thailand), 25 % broken, WR, milled
indicative survey price, government standard,
f.o.b. Bangkok
World Bank
22 Rice Vietnam Vietnamese rice, 5 % broken World Bank
23 Palm oil Palm oil (Malaysia), 5 % bulk, c.i.f. N. W. Europe World Bank
24 Groundnut oil Groundnut oil (any origin), c.i.f. Rotterdam World Bank
25 Coconut oil Coconut oil (Philippines/Indonesia), bulk, c.i.f.
Rotterdam
World Bank
26 Fishmeal Fishmeal (any origin), 64–65 %, c&f Bremen,
estimates based on wholesale price, beginning
2004; previously c&f Hamburg
World Bank
27 Beef Meat, beef (Australia/New Zealand), chucks and
cow forequarters, frozen boneless, 85 % chemical
lean, c.i.f. US port (East Coast), ex-dock,
beginning 11/2002; previously cow forequarters
World Bank
28 Chicken Meat, chicken (US), broiler/fryer, whole birds,
2½–3 pounds, USDA grade “A,” ice-packed,
Georgia Dock preliminary weighted average,
wholesale
World Bank
29 Sheep Meat, sheep (New Zealand), frozen whole
carcasses prime medium (PM) wholesale,
Smithfield, London, beginning 01/2006;
previously Prime Light (PL)
World Bank
30 Wheat/CBT #2 Soft red winter at contract price, #1 Soft red
winter at a 3 cent premium, Chicago Board of
Trade
Bloomberg
31 Corn/CBT #2 yellow at contract price, #1 yellow at a 1.5
cent/bushel premium, #3 yellow at a 1.5
cent/bushel discount, Chicago Board of Trade
Bloomberg
32 Soybeans/CBT #2 Yellow at contract price, #1 yellow at a 6
cent/bushel premium, #3 yellow at a 6 cent/bushel
discount, Chicago Board of Trade
Bloomberg
33 Soybean oil/CBT Crude soybean oil meeting exchange-approved
grades and standards, Chicago Board of Trade
Bloomberg
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Table 12.3 (continued)
w Variable Description Source
35 Rough rice/CBT US no. 2 or better long grain rough rice with a
total milling yield of not less than 65 % including
head rice of not less than 48 %, Chicago Board of
Trade
Bloomberg
36 Feeder cattle/CME 650–849 pound steers, medium-large #1 and
medium-large #1–2, Chicago Mercantile
Exchange
Bloomberg
37 Live cattle/CME 55 % choice, 45 % select, yield grade 3 live
steers, Chicago Mercantile Exchange
Bloomberg
38 Lean hogs/CME Hog (barrow and gilt) carcasses, Chicago
Mercantile Exchange
Bloomberg
39 Wheat/KCBT Hard red winter wheat, no. 2, at contract price;
no. 1 at a 1½-cent premium; Kansas City Board
of Trade
Bloomberg
40 Wheat/MGEX Hard red spring wheat, no. 2 or better Northern
spring wheat with a protein content of 13.5 % or
higher; Minneapolis Grain Exchange
Bloomberg
41 White maize/SAFEX South African Futures Exchange; starting in
08/1996
Bloomberg
42 Yellow maize/SAFEX South African Futures Exchange; starting in
08/1996
Bloomberg
43 Wheat/SAFEX South African Futures Exchange; starting in
11/1997
Bloomberg
44 Soybean/SAFEX South African Futures Exchange; starting in
04/2002
Bloomberg
45 Sunflower seeds/SAFEX South African Futures Exchange; starting in
02/1999
Bloomberg
46 Palm oil/MDEX Malaysia Derivatives Exchange; starting in
03/1995
Bloomberg
47 GSCI agriculture Price index over active futures with the 2012 S&P
GSCI weights on wheat (CBT), wheat (KCBT),




48 Trade weighted country
index
Price index over US corn, US HRW and Thai 5 %
spot prices according to the trade shares (imports
plus exports of commodity divided by imports




49 Rice/Vietnam Vietnam, rice (25 % broken), export FAO GIEWS
50 Rice/Vietnam Vietnam, rice (5 % broken), export FAO GIEWS
51 Rice/Pakistan Pakistan, rice (25 % broken), export FAO GIEWS
52 Rice/Pakistan Pakistan, rice (Basmati ordinary), export FAO GIEWS




w Variable Description Source
54 Rice/USA USA, rice (US California medium grain), export FAO GIEWS
55 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (25 % broken), export FAO GIEWS
56 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (5 % broken), export FAO GIEWS
57 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (fragrant 100 %), export FAO GIEWS
58 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (glutinous 10 %), export FAO GIEWS
59 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (parboiled 100 %),
export
FAO GIEWS
60 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (Thai 100 % B), export FAO GIEWS
61 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (Thai A1 Super), export FAO GIEWS
62 Wheat/Argentina Argentina, wheat (Argentina, up river, trigo pan),
export
FAO GIEWS
63 Maize/Argentina Argentina, maize (Argentina, up river), export FAO GIEWS
Source: Own elaboration
Robustness Checks for Transmission to Grain Price Index
Fig. 12.7 Global price transmission to the domestic grain price index under different significance
levels and model specifications. Source: Own elaboration
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Price Transmission from Individual Grain Prices
Fig. 12.8 Transmission from several international wheat prices to the domestic grain price index
and affected people
296 M. Kalkuhl
Fig. 12.9 Transmission from several international maize prices to the domestic grain price index
and affected people
Fig. 12.10 Transmission from several international rice prices to the domestic grain price index
and affected people
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Fig. 12.11 Transmission from Thai rice prices (export) to the domestic grain price index and
affected people
Fig. 12.12 Transmission from several international oilseed prices to the domestic grain price


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 2.5 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/) which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s)
and source are credited.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or
reproduce the material.
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